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ABSTRACT 
 
Background and motivation 
 
For many small countries with a long history of conflicts with a large neigh-
bouring country, the question of national security has a high priority. Alterna-
tive survival strategies include a sufficiently strong defence capability in terms 
of the defence design and quality of defence materiel or, alternatively, a mem-
bership in a defence alliance. Such choices should be based on cost/benefit 
analyses. The urgency of such analyses becomes burning if tensions arise for 
one reason or another or if the available options change and attract public dis-
cussions, or if the safety class of the country has deteriorated. 
 
In Finland, the choice between a military draft (conscription) and an all-
volunteer professional army has been the subject of continuous debate over 
the years. Moreover, as a result of Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014 and 
the subsequent Ukraine crisis, tensions also intensified in the Baltic Sea area. 
After the Cold War, there was a peaceful period in Western and Central Eu-
rope. However, subsequent aggressive political tensions grew. As a response 
both in Finland and in Sweden, the issue of a potential membership in 
NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been at the core of the 
debate. As a result of increased tension, Sweden has regretted its abolishment 
of the draft and its demilitarisation of Gotland Island. It has tried coming 
back to a partial draft army, but with limited success. 
 
The issue of how much to allocate resources to national defence has to do 
with the valuation of the willingness of the country’s citizens concerning the 
importance of national security. In repeated surveys, such willingness is ap-
preciated by more than 70 per cent of the population in Finland. This is ap-
parently based on the history of the country with repeated aggressions be-
tween the Swedish and Russian empires and the attacks by the Soviet Red 
Army at the beginning of and during World War II.   
 
Research tasks 
 
Analytical views on motives behind countries’ fighting have attracted a lot of 
attention in the theory of conflicts. However, no behavioural theory has been 
analytically formulated in terms of the risk-taking attitudes of individual sol-
diers, particularly in a defending army against a larger predator. The current 
study aimed to produce such an analysis, suggesting a theory of commitment 
to defend in the spirit of intertemporal altruism across generations. Such an 
analysis is included as the first article in the current collection. It is extended 
to study the possibilities of creating deterrence against an attacking army by 
means of communication and the signaling of the willingness to defend itself. 
The approach employs game theoretic tools. The second article focuses on 
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the issue of army design through a draft or is alternatively based on a profes-
sional army. The third article derives the mathematical option value for a 
membership in a defence alliance in terms of a coalition theory. In both of 
them, the analysis is based on a cost-benefit approach. In both articles, the key 
analytic concept to start with is the risk classification of a country. 
 
The key building block in setting up the national defence is based on the ac-
quisition of appropriate defence materiel. Two articles in this collection pro-
vide multi-stage analytic decision-theoretic approaches for two issues, i.e. off-
sets and joint procurements. No previous economic theory of offsets is avail-
able in the existing literature. The issue is timely, as Finland has launched its 
plan to replace its current F/A-18 fighters with a new type of fighter in the 
coming years. Joint procurements in the acquisition of defence material be-
tween independent countries make sense as they seem to be economically jus-
tified. In reality, few have actually taken place. The fifth article in the current 
collection attempts to explain why this is probably the case. For example, ef-
forts to jointly carry out the acquisition of the NH90 helicopters among four 
Nordic countries failed. Moreover, despite the obvious benefits of joint pro-
curements between the small Baltic states, they never appear to take place. 
 
Finally, the cyber technologies appear to provide a new and complementary 
instrument for conventional armament. In 2010, the world learned about 
Stuxnet, a malicious computer worm believed to be jointly created by Ameri-
can and Israeli cyber weapon specialists. Experts have been convinced that 
Stuxnet was meant to sabotage the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz in 
Iran and its centrifuge operational capacity, but the damage spread to other 
units, too. It is believed that most of the infected computers worldwide by 
Stuxnet have been in Iran. The Stuxnet attack is the background for the last 
article in this collection. It explains why cyber technologies have potentially 
led to a new era of warfare between hostile countries. 
 
Research methods 
 
The aim of the current study is to address the issues related to factors or deci-
sions that determine the national security in a small country: the willingness to 
defend, the army design, potential membership in a military coalition, the ac-
quisition of the defence materiel, and the role of cyber capability as a new type 
of warfare. The approach of the current collection of studies is based on the 
employment of economic tools and includes economic cost/benefit analyses, 
mathematical optimisation methods, game-theoretic models, extensions to the 
Tullock model in contests, and the Nash bargaining approach in arriving at 
contracts. National security is viewed as a public good and the question is how 
to incentivise the decision-makers to arrive at the best policies. Tools of in-
formation economics are relevant, as a small defending country must try to 
communicate and signal to a potential predator its commitment to defend.  
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Analytic economic methods are not that typical in the discussions and debates 
on national security in our country. One reason may be that the war games in 
such an approach take place in a fictitious mathematical world. It is hoped, 
however, that with its theoretical results, the current study is able to deliver a 
message of the usefulness of economic and mathematical tools for conflict 
studies. Starting with his works in the 1920s, the game theory was initially de-
veloped by the Hungarian mathematical genius, John von Neumann. His fo-
cus, however, was on zero-sum games, yet typical confrontations in politics or 
conflicts are not necessarily characterised by zero-sum games. Instead, the 
Coase theorem suggests the opposite: a peaceful settlement of issues is Pare-
to-efficient and should lead to a surplus-maximising win-win outcome. Then, 
the issue arises as to why a commitment to a no-fight equilibrium is so diffi-
cult to obtain in the real world. The subsequent development of game theory 
has moved in other directions: negotiation, bargaining and signaling under 
informational restrictions. The pioneering work by Thomas C. Schelling, the 
Nobel prize winner in economics in 2005, characterised the key elements in 
war games. In his Nobel prize lecture, he expressed his delight on that the 
world had been able to live without a nuclear war for over sixty years. The 
famous lesson stated by the Prussian General von Clausewitz in the 19th cen-
tury on “…not [taking] the first step without considering the last” is one of 
the corner stones of the modern dynamic game theory. 
 
The purpose of mathematical models employed in economics is not to say 
that they represent the real world. The model world is fictitious and it exists 
only in the brains of the researchers – and in their publications. Their justifica-
tion arises from their operation as helpful instruments in checking the validity 
of thinking and of the stated arguments. Human brains make mistakes, but 
the mathematics does not. The purpose of models is to build into the analysis 
the key mechanisms to be examined, rather than the whole messy real world. 
Many aspects are therefore left out on purpose without claiming that they are 
irrelevant. The purpose instead, is to put the focus on the key mechanisms. 
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YHTEENVETO 
 
Tutkimuksen tausta ja motivaatio 
 
Monelle pienelle maalle, jonka historiaan sisältyy konflikteja suuremman naa-
purimaan kanssa, kansallinen turvallisuus on keskeinen haaste. Vaihtoehtoiset 
selviytymisstrategiat edellyttävät riittävän puolustuskyvyn rakentamista, riittä-
vän puolustuskaluston hankintaa sekä mahdollisesti jäsenyyttä puolustusliitos-
sa. Kaikkien näiden valintojen tulisi perustua hyöty-kustannusanalyyseihin. 
Sellaisten analyysien tarve korostuu, jos jännitys lähialueilla syystä tai toisesta 
kiristyy ja jos maan riskiluokka heikkenee. 
 
Suomessa on pitkään käyty keskustelua yleisen asevelvollisuuden ja vapaaeh-
toisen asepalveluksen paremmuudesta. Venäjä liitti Krimin itseensä vuonna 
2014. Tuolloin käynnistynyt Ukrainan kriisi on lisännyt jännitystä myös Itäme-
ren alueella. Kylmän sodan jälkeen Länsi- ja Keski-Euroopassa vallitsi rauhan 
kausi. Tilanteen kiristyminen on johtanut sekä Suomessa että Ruotsissa kes-
kusteluun jäsenyyden hakemisesta puolustusliitto NATO:oon. Ruotsi on niin 
ikään katunut päätöstään luopua yleisestä asevelvollisuudesta ja Gotlannin saa-
ren demilitarisoinnista. Se on pyrkinyt palauttamaan tietynasteisen asevelvolli-
suuden, mutta ei ole siinä onnistunut. 
 
Kuinka paljon kansalliseen puolustukseen tulisi sijoittaa yhteiskunnan resurs-
seja, riippuu siitä, kuinka tärkeäksi kansallinen turvallisuus kansalaisten kes-
kuudessa koetaan. Kyselyjen perusteella maanpuolustustahto on Suomessa 
korkea. Tämä on varmaankin yhteydessä maan historiaan. Suomen alue joutui 
toistuvien Ruotsin ja Venäjän välisten sotien näyttämöksi. Toinen selitys kor-
kealle maanpuolustustahdolle löytyy Neuvostoliiton aggressiosta toisen maa-
ilmansodan aikana. 
 
Tutkimustehtävät 
 
Konfliktien tutkimuksessa on varsin paljon arvioitu syitä ja motiiveja sotimi-
selle. Mikään käyttäytymisteoria ei kuitenkaan ole tuottanut analyyttista esitystä 
yksittäisen sotilaan valmiudelle ottaa vastuuta puolustustehtävästä ja siihen 
liittyvästä riskistä, kun on kyse puolustautumisesta suurempaa uhkaajaa vas-
taan. Käsillä olevan tutkielman ensimmäinen essee tuottaa tätä koskevan ana-
lyysin. Se rakentuu ajatukselle sukupolvien ylittävästä altruistisesta motiivista. 
Sen pohjalta esseessä kehitetään analyysi siitä, miten puolustautuva maa voi 
omilla puolustusratkaisuillaan pyrkiä luomaan riittävän kynnyksen potentiaali-
sen vihollisen hyökkäyksen ehkäisemiseksi. Yksi osa tätä strategiaa on, että 
puolustaja samalla pyrkii kommunikoimaan viholliselle valmiutensa ja halunsa 
puolustautua. Analyysi hyödyntää peliteoriaa. Toisessa esseessä esitetään ver-
tailu yleisen asevelvollisuuden ja vapaaehtoisen asepalveluksen välillä. Kritee-
rinä on kansantalouden hyvinvointi, jossa tulojen lisäksi toisena tekijänä on 
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kansallinen turvallisuus. Kolmas essee pureutuu kysymykseen mahdollisesta 
jäsenyydestä puolustusliitossa ja johtaa tähän liittyvän option matemaattisen 
arvon. Molemmat rakentuvat sen ajatuksen varaan, että eri maat ovat riskiluo-
kaltaan eri asemassa. 
 
Kansallisen turvallisuuden vahvistamisessa myös oikea puolustusvälineistö on 
avainasemassa. Kaksi seuraavaa esseetä käsittelevät tähän liittyvää päätösteori-
aa niin sanottujen vastakauppojen sekä yhteishankintojen muodossa. Huoli-
matta laajasta kirjallisuudesta vastakauppojen talousteoriaa ei ole ollut olemas-
sa. Neljännessä esseessä luodaan tällainen teoria. Vaikka yhteishankinnat näyt-
tävät taloudellisesti perustelluilta, niitä tapahtuu kuitenkin huomattavan vähän. 
Viides essee tarjoaa useita selityksiä sille, miksi näin on asianlaita. Esimerkiksi 
yhteispohjoismainen kopterihankinta ei toteutunut ja useat suunnitellut on 
sittemmin peruttu. Myöskään pienet Baltian maat eivät jostain syystä tee yhtei-
siä kalustohankintoja. 
 
Kyberaikakaudella perinteinen aseistus on saanut kilpailijan ja sodankäynti sa-
malla uuden instrumentin. Vuonna 2010 maailman tietoon tuli Stuxnet, tahal-
linen tietokonevirus, jonka uskottiin olleen amerikkalaisten ja israelilaisten spe-
sialistien tuottama. Uskotaan, että sen tarkoitus oli sabotoida Natanzin 
uraanirikastamoa ja sen kapasiteettia Iranissa, mutta sen tuhovaikutus levisi 
muihinkin yksikköihin. Tämä tapahtumaketju on viimeisen esseen aihe. Siinä 
pyritään selittämään, miten kyberteknologia on johtanut uuden sodankäynnin 
aikakauteen vihollisvaltioiden välillä. 
 
Tutkimusmenetelmät 
 
Käsillä olevan tutkielman tarkoitus on pureutua kansallisen turvallisuuden seli-
tystekijöihin pienessä maassa: puolustushalu, asepalveluksen valinta, mahdolli-
nen jäsenyys sotilasliitossa, kalustohankinnat ja kybersodan rooli. Tutkielma 
hyödyntää taloustieteen tutkimusvälineistöä: hyötykustannusanalyysia, mate-
maattisia optimointimenetelmiä, peliteoriaa, niin sanotun Tullock-mallin laa-
jennuksia konfliktien teoriassa ja Nashin neuvotteluteoriaa. Kansallinen turval-
lisuus nähdään julkishyödykkeenä ja kysymys kuuluu, mitkä ovat oikeat ja siten 
kansakunnalle parhaat päätökset. Informaation talousteorian välineet osoittau-
tuvat tärkeiksi, kun on tarve analysoida kysymystä siitä, miten kommunikoida 
potentiaaliselle viholliselle maan puolustustahto. 
 
Kansallista turvallisuutta koskevissa väittelyissä taloustieteen välineistö ei ole 
ollut Suomessa laajalemmin käytössä. Selitys voi löytyä siitä, että matemaattiset 
analyysit toteutuvat kuvitteellisessa matemaattisen maailmassa. On kuitenkin 
toivottavaa, että tämän tutkielman tulosten myötä taloustieteellisten ja mate-
maattisten välineiden arvo tutkimukselle tulee ilmeiseksi. Peliteorian kehitti 
alun perin unkarilainen matematiikan nero, John von Neumann. Hänen pai-
nopisteensä oli nollasummapeleissä. Kuitenkaan useimpia ristiriitatilanteita ei 
ole syytä aidosti nähdä nollasummapeleinä. Niinpä Coasen teoreema viestittää 
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siitä, että rauhanomainen konfliktien purkaminen neuvottelemalla edustaa Pa-
reto-tehokkuuteen ja ylijäämän maksimoivaan lopputulokseen johtavaa ratkai-
sua. Tästä näkökulmasta kuitenkin avautuu kysymys: miksi reaalimaailmassa 
niin usein jää toteutumatta tasapaino, jossa ei sodita?  
 
Sittemmin peliteoria on kehittynyt suuntaan, jossa tarkastellaan neuvottelua ja 
kommunikointia. Sotien ja konfliktien teorian pioneeri, Thomas C. Schelling 
osoittautui töillään vuoden 2005 taloustieteen Nobel-palkinnon arvoiseksi tut-
kijaksi. Nobel-luennossaan hän ilmaisi tyytyväisyytensä siihen, että maailma oli 
onnistunut elämään ilman ydinasesotaa yli 60 vuotta. 1800-luvun preussilaisen 
kenraalin von Clausewitzin sanoin: ”Ensimmäistä askelta ei tulisi ottaa ennen, 
kuin on selvittänyt, mikä on se viimeinen askel”. Tämä viisaus on dynaamisen 
peliteorian kulmakiviä. 
 
Matemaattisiin analyysivälineisiin tukeutuminen ei ole itsetarkoitus. Tarkoitus 
ei ole väittää, että ne edustavat reaalimaailmaa. Mallimaailma on kuvitteellinen 
ja se on olemassa vain tutkijoiden aivoissa – ja heidän tieteellisissä julkaisuis-
saan. Niiden käyttämisen oikeutus perustuu siihen, että ne toimivat tutkijan 
ajattelun, logiikan ja esitettyjen argumenttien validiuden testinä. Ihmisen aivot 
tekevät virheitä, matematiikka ei. Tarkoitus aina on, että malleihin sisällytetään 
vain tutkittavan kysymyksen kannalta kaikkein oleellisimmat mekanismit ää-
rimmäisen monimutkaisen reaalimaailman asemesta. Mallit ovat yksinkertais-
tuksia ja monet reaalimaailman elementit jätetään niistä pois, ei siksi, että ne 
olisivat irrelevantteja, vaan siksi, että tarkoitus on keskittyä kaikkein oleellisim-
paan. 
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1 
CONFLICTS: HISTORY AND OVERVIEW 
 
1.1. Violence and life 
Human history is witness to violence and fights between tribes, societies, and 
nations. The reasons and motives for violence are many and have been the 
subject of a large number of studies in various disciplines including military 
studies, psychology, evolutionary studies, social sciences and economics. No 
single explanation can emerge. The motives of wars include psychological, 
biological, economic and geopolitical reasons.1 In contrast to conventional 
wars, the warfare in modern times has also developed into new destructive 
instruments like chemical or biological strikes, terrorism, and more recently to 
cyber attacks, information war, or a hybrid war that combines several ele-
ments. When the military capacities between those in conflict deviate substan-
tially, a war is an asymmetric one. There can be a predator and a victim. For 
one of the parties, it is a matter of making an attack and for the other one a 
defence war.2  
 
It should be pointed out that wars should not exist in equilibrium: according 
to the Coase theorem, the conflicting partners could peacefully negotiate, 
avoiding the cost of war and reaching a surplus-maximizing outcome. As we 
repeatedly see wars, the conditions for the Coase theorem appear not to be 
valid. The key question then arises: why is this the case? In the current study, 
possible answers are provided in two essays (Essay 1 and Essay 6). In eco-
nomic terms, wars represent non-Paretian and destructive mechanisms of 
competition for power, resources, or prestige. Peaceful periods in the human 
history have been repeatedly followed by aggressive fights between nations 
and their armies. Based on the extensive historical data set, however, Harvard 
psychology Professor Steven Pinker has provided the provocative proposition 
                                                 
1 The survey by Levy (1989), for example, has 800 references. The bioeconomic causes of 
war have been addressed by Hirshleifer (1998) stating that ”… the ultimate motives for 
fighting are food and sex, the essential elements of reproductive success… humans seek 
food and sex directly, but also indirectly via dominance and prestige…In modern 
times…intangible goals such as prestige, dominance, and respect … remain with us as the 
continuing causes of war.” An interesting recent work by Iyigun, Nunn and Qian (2017) 
has found a link between the increase in the agricultural productivity and the reduction of 
conflicts for roughly two centuries after potatoes were introduced from South America to 
the Old World. 
2 Excellent surveys of the economic research on wars have been provided by the Handbook 
of Defense Economics, 1 and 2, ed. by Sandler and Hartley (1995, 2007), Jackson and Morelli 
(2009), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2012) and Baliga and Sjöström (2013). 
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that the evolution of the societies and the world have made humans more 
peaceful (Pinker, 2011). His data suggest that relative to the world population, 
fewer people die in wars in modern times than in the history.3 His book led to 
a sharp intellectual confrontation with Cirillo and Taleb (2016), who ques-
tioned his statistics. A shocking record from peaceful Nordic countries reveals 
that few countries have fought more against each other than Sweden, Den-
mark and Norway: after Gustav Vasa came to power in 1523, there were elev-
en fights among them over 300 years. 
1.2. Military expenditures in today’s world 
Countries allocate substantial resources to their military capacities; their de-
fence budgets may even amount to several per cent of the GDP. The costs 
and benefits of the military, however, are not measured by the size of their 
military budgets but rather by the welfare cost of taxation and the security ef-
fect of the army as a public good. The international markets for defence mate-
riel are well-organised and rather competitive though the political interest con-
flicts have an important role to play there.4 
 
The relationship between military expenditures and economic growth has 
been an issue for quite some time. In the literature, there are several channels 
identified that may simultaneously produce positive and negative impacts of 
military expenditures on economic growth. In the end, one would expect that 
the relatiohship is negative as consumption and national security represent 
competing aims of resource allocation. A meta analysis on the controversy of 
the effects of wars was carried out by Alptekin and Levine (2012). They re-
viewed 32 empirical studies with 169 estimates of the effect of military ex-
penditure on economic growth. They found that actually the hypothesis of a 
negative military expenditure-growth relationship is not supported for both 
                                                 
3 The worst event in terms of human suffering by fights took place in China, in the rebel-
lion and the civil war of An Lushan in 755-763 when 36 million people, 17 per cent of the 
world population, died. During the wars of Ghenghis Khan in the late 12th and early 13th 
centuries, 40 million died amounting to 1 per cent of the world population. During World 
War II, 55 million people died amounting to 2,2 of the world population. Referring to the 
book by Royle (1989), Hirshleifer (1998) notices that Genghis Khan (1162-1227) is sup-
posed to have said: “The greatest pleasure is to vanquish your enemies, to chase them be-
fore you, to rob them of their wealth, to see their near and dear bathed in tears, to ride 
their horses and sleep on the white bellies of their wives and daughters”. In his monumen-
tal book Pinker argues that the mechanisms of reason, empathy, the moral sense, and self-
control have made the world safer. In tribe societies, empathy was more concentrated on 
one’s own kin and relatives while modern humans are able to feel empathy towards 
strangers, too. A similar view can be found in Seabright (2010). Moreover, when the state 
has monopolised the violence, the use of one’s own hand is no more profitable. Economic 
development has made other people more valuable when alive than dead and the coopera-
tion has replaced anarchy. The developed countries do not often fight against each other 
perhaps because the mutual costs of war are so enormous.  
4 Military Balance is the key report of the military expenditures in the world. 
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LDSs and in general while a positive effect of military expenditure on eco-
nomic growth is supported for developed countries. One could speculate that 
the finding may perhaps be explained at least partly by the fact that the devel-
opment of new technologies and the associated military innovations have 
been driving the technology frontier even faster than the innovation in purely 
civil areas.5 
1.3. Is the Cold War back? 
After World War II, Western Europe has been a continent of peaceful devel-
opment. The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s increased optimism con-
cerning the future. The German reunification and the extension of NATO 
membership to most of the former Soviet allies in Europe and to the Baltic 
states, led to optimism about a peaceful development within Europe. In the 
aftermath, however, the furious civil wars in the former Yugoslavia shook 
such optimism. The Kosovo crisis led to military intervention by the NATO 
air forces. The Russian trauma associated with the collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion in 1991 led to a new confrontation, first in Georgia and subsequently in 
Ukraine.6 Russia released a new military doctrine on December 26, 2014, to 
demonstrate its position in the world. NATO has strengthened its presence in 
the Baltic states and in Poland. In a sense, the Cold War is back in Europe. 
1.4. Terrorism – war without frontiers 
Outside Europe, terror attacks have been common, with the purpose of caus-
ing damage in terms of lives lost and fear among people. Their effect is much 
bigger than the number of victims who die. Terrorist attacks have arrived to 
Europe in recent years, with militant islamists targeting people in the cities of 
Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Russia, Sweden and Finland. It is 
apparently legitimate to trace the roots of the most recent wave terrorism in 
Europe to the attack initiated by American and British leaders against Iraq in 
2003. On terrorism, an early reference is Sandler (2005) while Carceles and 
Tauman (2011) represents a more recent one. The literature on terrorism is 
expanding fast, but the literature on cyber war and hybrid war is yet to come. 
 
1.5. War as a strategic or political instrument: Sun, von Clausewitz, Machia-
velli  
Early views on warfare go back to ancient times. Among the famous thinker, a 
Chinese general Sun Tzu, living around 500 B.C., appears as the earliest one. 
The descriptions within The Prince by Machiavelli have the general theme of 
                                                 
5 It is sad to state that many human innovations – gunpowder, radar, antibiotics - have 
been linked to military aims rather than for the benefit of the civil sectors of society. 
6 The Georgian War was actually initiated by the Georgian leaders, not by Russia! The po-
litical reasons for the war in Ukraine are the subject of some dispute. 
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accepting that the aims of princes—such as glory and survival—can justify the 
use of immoral means to achieve those ends. For him, the two most essential 
foundations for any state, whether old or new, are sound laws and strong mili-
tary forces. A self-sufficient prince is one who can meet any enemy on the 
battlefield. He should be "armed" with his own army. Machiavelli stood 
strongly against the use of mercenaries, believing that they are useless for a 
ruler because they are undisciplined, cowardly, and without any loyalty, being 
motivated only by money. Machiavelli attributed the Italian city states’ weak-
ness to their reliance on mercenary armies. 
 
The most influential writer of the 19th century on warfare was Prussian Gen-
eral von Clausewitz. He is famous primarily as a military theorist interested in 
the examination of war, utilizing the campaigns of Frederick the Great and 
Napoleon as the frames of reference to his work. He wrote a careful, system-
atic, philosophical examination of war in all its aspects. The result was his 
principal work, On War, a major work on the philosophy of war. He stressed 
the dialectical interaction of diverse factors, noting how unexpected develop-
ments unfold in the face of incomplete, dubious, and often completely erro-
neous information and high levels of fear, doubt, and excitement. Often stat-
ed as the words of von Clausewitz: "War is thus an act of force to compel our 
enemy to do our will." The second, often treated as von Clausewitz's bottom 
line, "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means." The well-
known citation from von Clausewitz (cf. Holmes (2007)) is given (p. 584) as; 
“the clearer appear the connections between its separate actions, and the more 
imperative the need not to take the first step without considering the last”. 
Such a requirement of foresight essentially aligns with the message of the 
modern dynamic game theory. 
1.6. Picking up the right game theory: John von Neumann vs Thomas C. 
Schelling 
With the introduction of modern research methods developed in mathemat-
ics, economics, and evolutionary biology, conflict studies have provided in-
sights into the motives, incentives, processes and mechanisms of conflicts. 
Analyses today most often employ game-theoretic approaches. While John 
von Neumann, the founder of zero-sum games spoke for a nuclear attack by 
the US on the Soviet Union, Thomas C. Schelling had the opposite idea. For 
him, the world is not a platform of zero-sum games but rather a network of 
non-cooperative actions with multiple equilibria with win-win strategies avail-
able.7 
 
The economic analysis of conflicts was introduced by Schelling (1960, 1965), 
the subsequent Nobel prize winner in economics. Though not fully formal, 
                                                 
7 Those sharply opposite views by von Neumann and Schelling are documented in Harford 
(2008) and were relevant in the tension between the USA and the Soviet Union. 
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his analyses were written in the spirit of non-zero-sum game theory. Schelling 
considered a conflict from the point of view of rational players under infor-
mational restrictions. In such a setting, the credibility of statements and ac-
tions, the commitment, becomes the key concern for the participants in a mu-
tual confrontation. The sensitive equilibrium is defined in terms of the expec-
tations of the expectations of the opponent concerning the expectations of 
the opponent concerning the expectations… and so forth. Schelling was writ-
ing in an era when both superpowers had accumulated huge reserves of nucle-
ar weapons.8 
 
After Schelling, the approaches and solution concepts of game theory were 
applied in the context of the theory of conflicts. A combination of a political 
economy and game theoretic view in the issues of peace and war was provided 
by de Mesquita (2006). 
1.7. Who is the likely winner in warfare? 
When a conflict turns into war, the probability of the victory is determined by 
the relative strength of those involved. Tullock (1967, 1980) formalised this 
idea which has subsequently been studied by a number of authors including 
Hirshleifer (1991), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007), Konrad (2009) and 
Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2010). Several refinements have been suggested 
in terms of contest success function, which is the key analytic tool in the theo-
ry of war games today.9 
1.8. Alliance formation 
The basic model of controlling conflicts through an alliance formation was 
developed by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) and extended subsequently by 
Sandler and Hartley (2001) and Ray and Vohra (1999). Free riding turned out 
to be the key incentive issue in the provision of international public goods. 
The distinction between an offence and a defence war was earlier discussed by 
Lynn-Jones (1995) (see also Arce, Kovenock and Robertson, 2012). 
1.9. Arms race 
Baliga and Sjöström (2004) showed the conditions under which the unique 
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium between two players involves an arms race for 
sure. Grossman (2004, 2013) illustrated how the ability to negotiate a peaceful 
settlement depends on the divisibility of the outcome of the dispute, on the 
effectiveness of the fortifications and counterattacks and on the permanence 
of the outcome. Jacobsson (2009) showed how the cycles of war and peace 
                                                 
8 A recommended evaluation of Schelling’s work is Myerson (2009). 
9 It should be pointed out that the static Tullock model resembles the two-equation dynam-
ic differential equation system developed by Frederic Lanchester during World War I to 
show which of the two armies will win a war, cf. Davis (1995). 
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may arise in a model where the arming decisions and the decision whether to 
go to war takes place in a later stage. Spolaore (2009) reviewed the economics 
approach to conflicts and national borders and Alesina and Spolaore (2005) 
studied the relationship between international conflict and the size distribu-
tion of countries in a model in which both peaceful bargaining and non-
peaceful confrontations are possible. McQuire (2010) studied how economic 
productivity and trade, military technology and strategy, and political economy 
of governance can be combined to determine a country’s choice between 
peaceful trade and investment vs. predation and conquest of others. The ob-
servations of provocative actions led Baliga and Sjöström (2012) to analyse 
the effect of hawkish and dovish extremist strategies on the likelihood of a 
conflict. 
 
1.10 Towards empirical testig 
The modern development of research area extensively employs the methods 
of the game theory, the theory of incentives and information theory. As the 
data sources on various social developments have been substantially improved 
over the decades, high-quality empirical work on conflicts based on econo-
metric methods, including terrorism and civil wars has become possible and 
has provided a deeper understanding about the processes involved. Hwang 
(2012), for example, studied conflict technology and contest success functions 
estimating the elasticity of augmentation using actual battle data including 17th 
-century European battles, as well as those from World War II. 
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2 
ARTICLES IN THIS COLLECTION: THE RESEARCH ISSUES 
AND SUMMARY OF THE MAIN RESULTS 
 
2.1. Defence Commitment and Deterrence in the Theory of War  
 
CESifo Economic Studies, (2018), 1-22, doi: 10.1093/cesifo/ify001, published by 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Background 
 
The regularities and motives of war have been the subject of a large body of 
military studies. In the current paper, a particular type of war is under focus: 
asymmetric warfare between two countries with different military strengths. 
Large empires in particular, tend to control and even attack on their smaller 
neighbors. This paper studies an asymmetric war in the spirit of the predator-
victim framework. 
 
Over the course of history, no common motivation for war in general is avail-
able. Political science views appear to acknowledge the geopolitical factors. 
Economists have mostly considered wars as contests, largely neglecting other 
motivations for warfare. Motivational determinants apparently need to be in-
tegrated into the theory in a deeper and more consistent way to explain such 
behaviour. The paper introduces an economic approach building on the bio-
logical and evolutionary foundation. A unique feature of the model is that sol-
diers choose how much warfighting risk to take on themselves as a building 
block for the theory of defence and deterrence. The paper introduces a well-
defined intergenerational altruistic preference structure of individual fighters 
in conditions where the risk of death is the choice variable. The survival prob-
ability of the offspring is part of the altruistic preference structure of the indi-
vidual soldiers. To further motivate such a research agenda, the paper recalls 
that it is indeed the fight of the current generation for the survival of its off-
spring that is the fundamental mechanism in all nature. This concerns all liv-
ing creatures, even including plants.  
 
The literature on military studies justifies the view that motivational reasons 
for war, conflict, and aggression are many. The soldiers can care about a coun-
try winning the war for a number of reasons. Such a psychoanalytic view was 
advanced by Fornari (1975), who claimed that sacrifice is the essence of war: it 
translates into the willingness of humans to die for their country. Of course, 
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the paper does not challenge the literature of the military studies or of other 
motives. Our paper suggests that when it is a matter of survival for a victim to 
resist an attack by a stronger predator, the fundamental altruistic motives may 
become relevant.  
 
Such a concept is supported by many examples. In 480 BC, the vastly out-
numbered Greeks held off the Persians for seven days in the battle at the pass 
of Thermopylae in the most remarkable defence battle in history. In 1565, 700 
Johannite knights and 8000 Maltese soldiers successfully defended Malta is-
land against an Ottomans attack by an army of 40 000, more than four times 
greater. The Vietkong guerrillas were able to beat the more advanced US army 
during the 1960s. In the three-and-a-half-month Winter War of 1939, the 
Finnish army stopped Stalin's Red Army (though it was three times stronger), 
and did so for the second time in 1944 in the Battle of Tali-Ihantala (with the 
Red Army having four times the superior power), the largest-ever battle in the 
Nordic countries. Moreover, though it was five times larger, the Russian Red 
Army was defeated when it attacked the smaller German-Estonian defence 
forces at the Siltamäe battles in July and August 1944 causing a substantial loss 
of men. 
 
Research questions and approach 
 
Two questions are raised:  
 
? Is it possible to formulate a theory of an individual soldier as a group 
member on a battle field?  
? What are the implications for the optimal defence policy in a predator-
victim model of war with asymmetric information about the commit-
ment of the soldiers in providing a defence effort and about the per-
ceived cost of war? 
 
The paper introduces first an analysis of the risk-taking and commitment of 
an individual soldier in providing the defence effort in a predator-victim mod-
el. Each individual soldier is risk averse and is assumed to face the risk of 
death resulting both from exogenous reasons beyond his control and from his 
own choice in a conflict situation. It is then assumed that the risky operations 
call for collective actions and group cohesion. In particular, the commitment 
of providing a risky effort is assumed to arise from the intertemporally altruis-
tic preference towards the offspring. The soldier values both his own life and 
the life of his child. The defence effort of the soldiers results in an externality 
on the safety of the civilians. An individual soldier, however, is assumed to 
value the externality on the life of his child alone, not on the life of co-citizens 
and their children. The paper shows that in the commitment equilibrium, 
there is no underprovision of effort. Moreover, though the created national 
security is a non-excludable public good, the civilians who free ride on the 
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externality are financing its production through their tax liability. When build-
ing its national security, a potential victim hopes to communicate to the 
predator that it is committed to defending itself, by investing ex ante in de-
fence. Under informational asymmetries, however, it may be difficult to con-
vincingly communicate such a commitment. 
 
Results 
 
The main results of the paper are as follows. In the commitment equilibrium, 
intergenerational altruism can explain why the defending army fights hard, and 
even more so when the predator's military capacity is large. Small armies in 
particular fight harder than large armies. The implications for deterrence and 
defence policy are shown to be important. Indeed, the second set of results 
concerns the optimal size of the army. In the absence of informational con-
straints, there is a unique army size for deterrence. Under informational re-
strictions, a pooling equilibrium may exist where a victim with strong inter-
generational altruism overinvests in its army while the victim with a more lim-
ited intergenerational altruism free rides on the information gap of the preda-
tor building a smaller army. Conditions for the existence of a separating equi-
librium are established in terms of the cost of war. A victim with a high per-
ceived cost of war tends to be willing to build a large army as a costly signal 
with the purpose of being differentiated from a victim with a lower perceived 
cost of war. It turns out that the optimal defence policy need not satisfy the 
deterrence requirement, but rather the optimal army size is determined by the 
elasticities of the utility with respect to the tax cost and the probability of vic-
tory relative to the army size. The case of separating equilibrium helps to ex-
plain why wars exist in equilibrium. 
 
2.2. Security Gradient and National Defense – The Optimal Choice between 
a Draft Army and a Professional Army 
 
Defence and Peace Economics, 2018, 29(3), 247-267, published online 2016, March 
1, doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2016.1144898, published by Taylor and Francis, 
co-author: Staffan Ringbom.  
Background 
For each nation, the national security represents a public good. There are var-
ious ways of providing it. In 1970, the President’s Commission on An All-
Volunteer Armed Force (Gates Commission) launched its by now the classic 
analysis with the aim of eliminating the draft in the USA. The message of the 
Commission was well-taken by President Richard Nixon: the draft was re-
placed by an all-volunteer substitute. The arguments put forward by the 
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Commission were built both on the concerns of inefficiency and inequity 
characterized by the draft. One of the influential members of the Commis-
sion, Milton Friedman had strongly argued against the US draft since 1967 
(Friedman, 1967).? The attitudes were also influenced by the catastrophic Vi-
etnam war. Many countries in particular in the Western Europe have followed 
the US lead??, most recently Sweden (2010) ? and Germany (2011).?  
 
The widely-held view among the economic profession appears to be that un-
like the draft, the professional army is cost-efficient (see Warner and Asch 
(2001) for a review). The paper by Asch et al. (2007) suggests that there will be 
a force size below which volunteer forces are cheaper and beyond which a 
volunteer system is more costly. Their paper also provides an extensive over-
view on the empirics of the US manpower, the occupational choice, the opti-
mal mix of manpower and other inputs to military readiness and the role of 
reserves. The implications of the draft as a hidden tax were formally analyzed 
by Poutvaara and Wagener (2007). They introduced a striking proposition that 
the utility level in the steady state of an economy with a draft system always 
falls short of the utility level of an economy with a professional army. This 
conclusion is based on the following crowding-out mechanism: the effort into 
human capital formation through education and, consequently, the output and 
the consumption as well as the maximally obtainable utility level with a draft 
system always falls short of the utility level of an economy with a professional 
army. As both solutions to the military delay the education investment for the 
young involved, the individuals entering the professional army with a market 
salary welcome a positive tax due to the discounting benefit. They are paid for 
their service during the early stage of their life-cycle. Though they subsequent-
ly are taxed on their civil income to finance the next generation of the profes-
sional army they welcome such an intergenerational transfer. However, their 
interest is time-inconsistent: when old, they would prefer not to pay the tax. 
Thus, there is a built-in conflict between the generations in the professional 
army.  
 
The Poutvaara-Wagener -result is derived in a context where the social welfare 
criterion fails to capture the proper valuation of national security as a public 
good. Their model abstracts from the trade-off between the consumption of 
the market output as a private good and national security as a public good and 
appears valid only in a world with everlasting peace.? It should be noticed that 
the empirical evidence has widely supported their conclusion. 
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Research questions and approach 
 
Several questions are raised: 
 
? Is it possible to reproduce the Poutvaara-Wagener -result in a model 
with an explicit social welfare function and national security as a public 
good? 
? Why are there countries that do not follow the cost-efficient army de-
sign based on an all-volunteer army? 
? As the economic tools of public economics today are more advanced 
than they were in the early 1970s when the Gates Commission 
launched its report, do the new tools help to provide some new per-
spectives? 
The current paper provides a new perspective into the issue of an optimal ap-
proach to the optimal design of national security. The need for such an analy-
sis arises for two reasons. One is empirical, one is theoretical. From the em-
pirical point of view, there are countries which persistently appear not to fol-
low the US lead of an all-volunteer armed force. Those countries include Isra-
el in particular but also some European countries (Finland, Austria, Switzer-
land, Norway, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Tur-
key). These cases suggest that the US solution may not be universally optimal. 
Indeed, in Israel young men are servicing the security of the country for three 
years and the females for 21 months. Moreover, her defense budget amounts 
to 7 per cent of GDP. In Finland, the polls suggest that 72 per cent of the 
population favors the draft in the national defense. In Austria, the corre-
sponding figure is 60 per cent. In the 2013 referendum in Switzerland, 73 per 
cent of people stood behind the draft rejecting the professional army. The 
European countries which have abolished the draft have found another solu-
tion on their national security: relying on NATO as a joint alliance.  
 
There is also a theoretical reason for reconsideration the issue: the economic 
tools of public economic are today more advanced than they were in the early 
1970s when the Gates Commission launched its report.  
 
Our modeling approach differs from that of Poutvaara and Wagener (2007). 
They run the comparison between the draft army and the professional army 
by assuming that the military output is given, and that it equals the size of the 
active army. In our paper, we introduce explicitly the national security as a 
public good which needs to be produced. A draft and a tax-financed profes-
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sional army are alternative institutional arrangements to address the problem 
of security design. We identify countries in terms of their risk class in the face 
of an outside threat. On the way towards such an analysis, we however first 
reconsider the discounting argument. The draft indeed represents an implicit 
tax. However, as it is well-understood, the citizens of a country with an all-
volunteer army face another tax, an income tax, say. What this suggests is that 
from the efficiency point of view, the country with an all-volunteer army faces 
a double distortion, a tax on education and a tax on income required to ser-
vice the military. Consequently, the discounting benefit associated with the 
pay to the military should be balanced against the welfare loss.? 
 ? 
Results 
 
The paper reports two major results. What we find is that in the utility com-
parison, the Poutvaara-Wagener -result holds. At the equilibrium, the benefit 
of the young today equals the discounted tax cost to be paid subsequently and 
accompanied with the lower education and civil wage. This is our first main 
result. Moreover, those who outsource the military service to the profession-
als, are able to raise their education effort which enhances the national value-
added. This implies that the rewards on the military and the civilians become 
differentiated in the way which we show below. There is a utility-maximizing 
positive tax rate on old to finance the service of the young. However, even in 
that case it is utility-increasing to pay the young (draftees) an inter-
generational transfer, but a low one! Subsequently, we ask by how much the 
citizens of a country in a particular risk class are willing to pay as an insurance 
against an outside threat. This is an optimal tax problem which we state a 
trade-off between an income (wealth) effect and the security effect. We arrive 
at what we call a security gradient along which the countries can be located in 
terms of their security index. The size of the reserve and its quality determin-
ing the defense capacity qualify the optimal choice between the draft and the 
professional army. This is our second main result. Our numerical simulations 
illustrate the trade-off along the security gradient showing that above a critical 
risk class of countries, it is the draft which strictly dominates while for coun-
tries in a lower risk class, it is the professional army which dominates.  
 
As an illustration of our security gradient, think of Vatican with no outside 
threat and no military army, The Republic Uzupis with an army of 11 sol-
diers10, or Monaco with a professional army of roughly 200 soldiers. It would 
                                                 
10 This republic locates in Vilnius of Lithuania declared itself an independent republic in 
1997. No government has recognized its independence. 
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certainly be inefficient to have a draft in those cases. Think then about Israel, 
a country surrounded by a number of enemies. It could not handle its security 
unless based on the draft. The USA is a safe country in the sense that no en-
emy can conquer its territory. It does not need a draft to protect its bounda-
ries. It needs professionals to avoid another Pearl Harbor and the threat from 
missiles, like during the Cuban crisis. Not the same with Finland. Her collec-
tive memory dates back to the 14th century and extends over the subsequent 
centuries with repeated wars between her Eastern neighbor, Russia, and Swe-
den, with Finland being located between those countries.  
2.3. The Option Value of Membership in a Defence Alliance 
 
FinanzArchiv, 2017, 73(4), 1-20, published by Mohr Siebeck, co-author: Staffan 
Ringbom. 
 
Background 
 
The recent escalation of military tension in the Baltic Sea area has led to en-
hanced uncertainty about national security within the countries located there. 
The adverse development can be traced to military operations in early 2014. 
In response to the revolution in Ukraine, Russia incorporated the Crimean 
Peninsula into itself. The conflict intensified into military hostilities in eastern 
Ukraine, resulting in economic sanctions against Russia introduced by the 
West. Concerns have been expressed about the deterioration of the safety-
class of countries in the area, particularly of the small Baltic NATO members, 
Poland, and the non-member countries Sweden and Finland. Sweden gave up 
its infantry in 2010, and it has since been unable to rebuild a professional ar-
my. Sweden plans to return to the draft, at least partially, and to reestablish its 
former military base on Gotland Island after a targeted training attack by Rus-
sia with its air force carrying nuclear weapons. Both Sweden and Finland have 
subsequently signed what is called a “host country” agreement with NATO, 
yet without the protection provided by Article 5 for full members. Member-
ship in NATO, formed after the Second World War in 1949 as a joint defense 
alliance, indeed appears as a natural insurance option. It is puzzling that the 
membership option has not been exercised in those countries, and the current 
paper asks why.  
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Research questions and approach 
 
Several issues arise:  
 
? How could countries with a low safety class optimally respond to the 
increased tension?  
? How is the option value of membership determined?  
? Under what conditions is it optimal to abstain from the membership?  
? What size will a coalition become in a coalition equilibrium?  
? What will the price of membership in an equilibrium be?  
? What will the spillover effect on the existing members be, and in what 
ways are the membership decisions mutually linked? 
 
Our paper introduces an analytic welfarist approach to membership in a de-
fense alliance. References to the real-world NATO alliance are relegated to the 
footnotes, but this paper does hope to facilitate an analysis of the current 
burning real-world issues, too. Our focus is on the trade-off between domes-
tically and internationally provided security as public goods. In contrast to the 
earlier papers on alliances, heterogeneity of potential members is introduced 
in the model world of the paper in that the risk classification is country-
specific. This paper focuses on one source of heterogeneity between members 
only. Such an approach is not really restrictive. Differences in risk classifica-
tion may indeed arise from a number of exogenous reasons such as the loca-
tion of the country, the size of the population, or the defense attitude of the 
citizens arising from historical development, to mention a few of the most 
relevant reasons. 
 
In the model world of the current paper, it is assumed that alliance member-
ship is costly. Membership is conditional on the sufficient compatibility of the 
defense materiel between the members. The member countries must use re-
sources to build sufficient defense infrastructures and military bases, there 
must be participation in joint training and maneuvers of defense forces, and 
resources need to be allocated to crisis management programs. These repre-
sent the price of membership. An attack against any member by an enemy is 
not explicitly modeled. In such a scenario, the capacity of each member 
should, in principle, be available to defend any other member under attack. 
However, the participation and its scale necessitate a political decision that 
requires a cost–benefit analysis and may therefore be slow. Thus, it may not 
be clear what the security guarantees (say, Article 5) actually mean. Apart from 
that, the commitment may in some contingency be extremely costly. Consider 
a case where the commitment leads to escalation and potentially to a third 
world war and the use of nuclear arms. For this reason, it is also reasonable to 
consider a variant to the basic model allowing for expectations of commit-
ment uncertainty.  
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The architecture of the model world of our paper will build on the classic ap-
proach of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), but will add more structure. The 
member countries are heterogeneous in their safety classes. It will also be sug-
gested that planned membership in an alliance can launch preemptive maneu-
vers or counteractions by the enemy. There are many relevant real-world ex-
amples. In our model, the provision of collective security will be analyzed in 
terms of public-good provision by an alliance with heterogeneous members. A 
benefit/ cost ratio of membership is derived under a free-riding incentive. 
There is some novelty in the analysis with respect to the option value. All 
countries have sovereignty in their decisions on their defense budgets. The 
idea of a safety class in our paper is innovative from another perspective. Ana-
lyzing preemptive maneuvers or retaliatory actions of a potential enemy and 
the cost of commitment (analogous to Article 5) can be undertaken in a 
straightforward way in terms of their effect on the safety classification of a 
member. The idea of the determination of the equilibrium size of the defense 
coalition is new. With the exception of the paper byMacho-Stadler and Xue 
(2007), the existing literature does not help in understanding the dynamics of 
the alliance formation. Moreover, no other paper has analyzed the determina-
tion of the equilibrium cost of membership. This task is somewhat challenging 
when the members are heterogeneous in their safety classes. Consequently, 
they value the collective good differently. This raises a tricky issue: How is the 
decision process structured within an alliance when explicit majority decision-
making is ruled out? Our paper suggests an innovative procedure with implicit 
voting, to be analyzed in terms of the median-voter theorem. 
 
Results 
 
The main results are as follows. A sufficient condition for a single low-risk 
potential member to abstain from participation and a necessary condition for 
the participation of a high-risk potential member are stated. The optimal tax 
rate is shown to be declining in the safety classification of a member country. 
A potentially hazardous effect of the reduced risk from membership on the 
national defense investment is shown to follow. It is shown that membership 
can result in a complete crowding-out of the domestic defense capacity. The 
implications for the option value of membership are stated and extended to 
the case of imperfect credibility of the commitment and the cost of participa-
tion. The solution to the alliance equilibrium is found by fixed-point iteration. 
The driving force is the dispersion of the security classes. Expectations of the 
commitment concerning co-members can result in multiple equilibria. 
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2.4. Offset Contracts as an Insurance Device in Building the National De-
fence  
 
Defence and Peace Economics, published online 2017, June 02, 
doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1335366, published by Taylor and Francis, 
co-author: Juha-Matti Lehtonen. 
 
Background 
International trade in defence materiel is large. Most countries do not produce 
all their defence materiel by themselves. Instead, they meet some of their needs 
by engaging in trade in such material with other countries. For example, de-
fence is among Europe’s main sectors of industry, fuelling innovation and 
growth of the wider EU economy. The European Commission has stated that, 
with a turnover of 96 billion euro in 2012 alone, it is a major industrial sector, 
generating innovations and centred on high-end engineering and technologies.  
The production of defence materiel is characterised by high start-up costs and 
substantial research and development (R&D) investments. Such regularities 
point to the exchange as taking place in conditions that may markedly deviate 
from perfectly competitive markets and as subject to bargaining that generates 
economic rents. Taylor (2012) points to high transactions costs, incomplete 
and asymmetric information, and bounded rationality as characteristic of this 
exchange setting. High fixed costs in production may lead to increasing re-
turns, thereby creating incentives to augment the producer’s domestic market 
with export sales. Often, especially in the case of the aerospace industry, the 
contracts are of extensive scale, and the materiel represents public goods and 
is tax-financed by the purchasing government. The products in the markets 
are imperfect substitutes, and the buyer has to match them with the qualities it 
is hoping to acquire. These products are typically highly complex and consist 
of thousands of parts. 
‘Offset’ refers to any type of non-monetary compensation that a procuring 
government requires an exporting firm to provide as a condition of the sale, 
and it generally commits the exporting firm to spend a certain percentage of 
the value of the sale in the procuring country. An offset agreement is a con-
tract between a purchasing government and a foreign supplier. The latter is 
encouraged or even required to provide additional benefits for the purchasing 
government’s economy, beyond the base transaction. The term ‘offset’, or 
sometimes ‘industrial participation’, is used in connection with military items 
procured by governments: one factor in this is that, since Article IV.6 of the 
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World Trade Organization (W.T.O.) Agreement on Government Procurement 
forbids the use of offsets in general while exempting armaments, ‘offset’ may 
be deemed exclusive to defence purchases.  
Offsets are commonly divided between direct and indirect, where a direct off-
set is connected to the item purchased and an indirect offset is not, and be-
tween military and non-military (i.e. civilian) offsets. The compensation re-
quirement may take various forms; the U.S. applies the following categories 
for offset transactions: co-production, technology transfer, subcontracting, 
credit assistance, training, licensed production, investment, purchases, and 
other (B.I.S., 2016). Moreover, governments that demand offsets may differ in 
the amount of offset required and in the multipliers employed in calculation 
of the offset value of a specific transaction (e.g. B.I.S., 2016).  
Offsets are extensively used in trading in defence material. According to Un-
garo (2013), offsets between 2005 and 2016 were projected cumulatively to 
amount to $500 billion internationally. The view that emerges from the exist-
ing literature is that offsets represent marketing devices as nonstandard con-
tracting in international procurement amidst concentrated market structures 
and are particularly valuable in generating efficiency gains though they repre-
sent deviations from free trade. This is even though the European defence 
procurement directive (2009/81) and U.S. offset policy, echoing the W.T.O. 
view, are against offsets. Yet in 1993–2008, 48 U.S. firms signed, in all, 677 
offset agreements, worth $68.93 billion. In 2008, 14 companies entered into 
offset agreements, with 52 contracts, in support of $6.09 billion in export sales. 
For the last 15 years, the compensation ratio for U.S. firms that signed offset 
agreements is 70.96 per cent.  
In a study commissioned by the European Defence Agency (E.D.A.), Eriks-
son et al. (2007) estimated that there is a 40/60 split between direct and indi-
rect offsets in E.D.A. participating member states (pMS) but were unable to 
estimate the offset transactions’ value in relation to contract value. In the 
U.S.A., the 20th offset report to Congress (B.I.S., 2016) cited a $171 billion 
contract value covering offset clauses in 1993–2014, while the offset transac-
tion value in the same period was $71 billion. As direct offsets accounted for 
39,4 per cent of the actual value of the reported offset transactions in 1993–
2014 (B.I.S., 2016), one may conclude that the actual value of direct-offset 
transactions came to 16 per cent of the contract value during that time for 
U.S. military exports with offsets.  
In light of the fact that the international defence trade is very large and that 
offset contracts are very commonplace in connection with large deliveries, the 
previous analytic literature on offsets is surprisingly limited. Many fundamental 
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economic questions surrounding offsets have eluded analytic decision-
theoretic and bargaining-theoretic research.  
Research questions 
The following issues are raised in the current paper: 
 
? Why are offset requirements overwhelmingly dominant in contracts for 
the delivery of defence materiel, and why do they survive?  
? How large is the optimal offset claim to be imposed on its trade by an 
acquiring country?  
? What is the incidence of offsets, given that there can be no ‘free lunch’ 
in creating insurance?  
? How is the price of the delivery contract determined in light of the ac-
quiring country’s demands for an offset?  
? How does the offset requirement interact with the scale of the delivery 
contract?  
? What effect does the delivery contract being subject to the offset have 
on the acquiring country’s national security? 
 
The approach in the current paper 
 
In this paper, we analyse the economic benefits of a direct-offset transaction. 
A market for insurance against an adverse future contingency does not exist.11 
The paper introduces an alternative – and a new – view of the economics of 
offset requirements imposed by a purchasing country, considering them from 
the angle of their impact on national security. Australia’s policy of insisting that 
all industrial activities feeding into Australian Defence Force’s operational 
readiness have to be domestically provided serves as an example. Moreover, 
the insurance argument appears to apply to countries in the group of major 
defence equipment importers in EU of Eriksson et al. (2007) with, say Finland 
as example, when the risk classification of the country necessitates the ability 
to activate the defence force with no delay.  
The way a country designs the content of required offsets impacts significant-
ly the insurance dimension of contractual requirements. For example, when 
Finland bought its 62 F/A-18 Hornet planes from the US, it demanded that 
                                                 
11 Large exporting countries (such as the United States and France) do not need offsets, 
since they strive for self-sufficiency and complete independence. For medium-sized coun-
tries with sizeable exports (e.g. Italy and the Netherlands), offsets can be desirable for 
strengthening the country’s industrial base. In countries that are members of an alliance 
(such as Denmark or Norway), offsets may lead to the possibility of delivering compo-
nents, thereby strengthening the interdependence within the alliance. 
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they are assembled in the acquiring country in order to develop the local skills 
of services and to keep their flying ability as high as possible. The focus on 
such an offset requirement was unrelated to the imbalance of trade associated 
with the acquisition. 
According to the above-mentioned directive (2009/81/EC), any offsets within 
the E.U. must be based on national security, because exemptions from that 
directive may be made only under Article 346 T.F.E.U. However, the legal 
concept of national security is not defined clearly in Article 346; it leaves open 
how offset practices may be related to national security. Nations differ in the 
objectives they pursue through offsets. Erikson et al. (2006) found that medi-
um-sized countries that primarily export are interested in developing the na-
tional-defence technological and industrial base (D.T.I.B.) through mainly in-
direct offsets in technology transfer and defence exports while mainly import-
ing countries opt for direct offsets. The latter can enhance national security by 
sustaining national D.T.I.B. capability for equipment maintenance, thereby 
ensuring equipment availability. One concrete example is that complex de-
fence equipment requires significant training, maintenance, and servicing after 
acquisition if it is to be able to operate properly. In his case study of the Finn-
ish F-18 deal, Korhonen (2011) explains how direct offset for such operations 
as assembly and testing aids with maintenance throughout the service life. He 
concludes that it is especially beneficial in terms of knowledge and skill devel-
opment if the assembly and maintenance are performed by the same party. 
Offsets represent the key device for such aims.  
In fact, the mechanisms by which offsets enhance the national security are 
both direct and indirect. The possibility of assembling the aircraft domestically 
provides the valuable capability of servicing those fighters domestically too. It 
is widely recognised that high-tech, sophisticated modern defence instruments 
require periodic servicing and that, hence, many of them are incapable of op-
erating at any given time.12 An extreme example is the B-2 Bomber, which a 
Government Accountability Office report (G.A.O., 1997) described as requir-
ing 124 maintenance hours per flight hour, with an ultimate goal at the time of 
reducing this figure to 50 per flight hour. Clearly, therefore, the risk of not 
having sufficient defence equipment functional and operative at short notice 
is high. The necessary servicing involves installing spare parts etc. and having 
competent personnel on hand, the required tools and testing devices, and up-
dated programs available to facilitate maintenance and repairs. The risk of not 
having the necessary servicing available when needed from the delivering 
country is non-trivial.  
                                                 
12 It was reported in a Der Spiegel article of 20 December 2017 that, for example, only eight 
of the 109 Eurofighters in the German army’s equipment base are available for flying, sev-
en of the 67 transport helicopters and five of the 33 NH90 helicopters are in operational 
condition, and 21 of the 56 transport aeroplanes are in sufficiently good condition for op-
eration. Of course, such cases are not limited to the German army. 
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However, there is more than a direct impact of offsets on the national securi-
ty. They also enhance the industrial strength of the acquiring country. This, in 
turn, has a further spillover, i.e. indirect effect on the national security, since 
the technology transfer strengthens the operational capability of the economy. 
Such a vision is analysed in the economic model world presented below, sug-
gesting that the offsets do not represent a free lunch.  
In the model world of the paper, the acquiring country firstly decides on its 
offset requirement. After this, it negotiates with the delivering country on the 
price of the delivery. Finally, the acquiring country decides on how many units 
of the defence materiel it is going to buy.  
Results 
 
A dynamic multi-stage decision-theoretic approach is introduced to establish 
the optimal offset and its incidence, the contract price arising from bargaining, 
and the scale of the acquisition. A new rationale is suggested for offsets in 
terms of their role as an insurance devise. Results are derived for the pricing of 
delivery contracts subject to offset claims and their national security implica-
tions. It is shown that the national security is strictly convex in the offset trans-
action. As to the incidence of the offset, the offset claim is shown to be capital-
ised in the delivery price. The bargaining price is shown to depend on the value 
of the product to be delivered for the national security, the relative negotiation 
power of the contracting partners and the social cost of public funds. The anal-
ysis highlights the expectation effects of offsets on the bargaining price and the 
scale of delivery. The results aid in explaining why offsets are widely used in 
procurement contracts for defence materiel. As they contribute to the national 
security, they should be allowed to survive and not be denied under competi-
tion laws.  
2.5. Joint Procurements in Building National Defence: Why Are There So 
Few? 
 
Hecer, Discussion Papers No. 427, March 2018, Defence and Peace Economics, 
https//doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2018.1471320, published by Taylor and 
Francis, co-author: Juha-Matti Lehtonen. 
 
Background 
The economic benefits of joint acquisitions of existing defense materiel arise 
from increased bargaining power relative to the contractor and from reduced 
(average) costs arising from economies of scale in production. There is, how-
ever, a puzzle: why are such procurements so few?  
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Recently, pressures have intensified among the member states of the Europe-
an Union to create multinational programmes in terms of cooperative defence 
procurements. Such a view was forcefully advanced by the President of the 
European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker in his speech at the Defense and 
Security Conference, In defense of Europe, Prague, June 9, 2017, stating: “There 
are 178 different weapon systems in the EU, compared to 30 in the U.S. We allow our-
selves the luxury of having 17 different types of combat tanks while the United States is able 
to manage perfectly well with just one model. Absurdly, there are more helicopter types then 
there are governments to buy them! We must do better.” 
The defense materiel has become more and more sophisticated and technical-
ly advanced. As a result, its unit costs are constantly increasing. In 2014, the 
defense budgets of the European Defence Agency (EDA) members totaled 
195 billion Euros, of which defense investments amounted to 34.7 billion Eu-
ros13. The speech by Juncker points out that in addition to better facilitating 
the control of defense expenditures, qualitative improvements can be ob-
tained by reducing the heterogeneity of the materiel within European coun-
tries. Indeed, as it is well-understood, Europe’s defense expenditures do not 
match their efficiency with the comparable US expenditures, with the Euro-
pean Commission estimating that the EU would not even be half as efficient 
as the USA.  
Over the years, it has been suggested that the cost savings of collaboration in 
the development of new defense materiel may be significant. A recent NATO 
report on international cooperation calculates 40 percent savings for the Alli-
ance in an aircraft acquisition example comparing a sole developer and con-
sortium scenario, when considering a 95 percent learning curve and transac-
tion costs. However, while this example is purely theoretical, the report states 
that “international cooperation is characterized by a striking lack of empirical 
data on cost savings and operational gain” and “the costing data are usually 
either classified, too complex to evaluate, or the before-and-after costs are not 
comparable”. About the only public calculations available with savings figures 
are the Nordefco webpages, which estimate 100 M€ cost savings in common 
development, purchasing and maintenance of defense materiel during a fif-
teen-year period. 
                                                 
13 According to the statistics reported by the EDA, the UK (10.3 billion euro) and France 
(9.7 billion euros) were the dominating countries in European defense investments (includ-
ing R&D expenditures) in 2014. Germany was the third (4.7 billion euro). The 35 per cent 
benchmark of the EDA in European cooperation was met only by Spain (46 per cent), 
Italy (40 per cent) and Belgium (35 per cent) calculated over a 10-year period. Of course, 
the European average is held up by the UK, France and Germany which carry out most of 
the defense investments. 
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Ten years ago in November 2007, the Ministerial Steering Board of the EDA 
approved four collective benchmarks for investment: (i) Equipment procure-
ment (including R&D/R&T): 20% of total defense spending, (ii) European 
collaborative equipment procurement: 35% of total equipment spending, (iii) 
Defense Research & Technology: 2% of total defense spending, and (iv) Eu-
ropean collaborative Defense R&T: 20% of total defense R&T spending [8]. 
Faced with austerity and decreasing military budgets in the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crisis, in 2012 NATO launched the Smart Defence initiative for 
developing, acquiring, operating and maintaining military capabilities in a co-
operative manner for cost savings and efficiency. Corresponding efforts by 
the EDA are called pooling and sharing where pooling refers to having capa-
bilities on a collective basis while sharing means that some countries relin-
quish some capabilities with the assumption or guarantees that other countries 
will make them available when necessary. 
Collaboration in defense equipment purchasing is not a novel idea. In 2008 
there had been 59 collaborative acquisition projects in Europe since the early 
50s. Two of the main challenges of collaborative procurement are the harmo-
nization of operational requirements between the participating States, and the 
agreement on common timescales for the program. In addition, European 
defense collaboration has been inefficient and inflexible due to the juste retour 
(fair return) principle, where the industry of each participating nation should 
get a work share that corresponds to the financial contribution of its own 
government. Collaborative defense procurement programs often incur long 
delays, both before the actual start of the program and during the develop-
ment process, thereby providing the required capability much later than ex-
pected. The conventional view is that more partner nations make collabora-
tion more complex and inefficient, although they cannot confirm this hypoth-
esis with their admittedly limited number of cases.  
Collaboration in armament production has been attempted and has taken 
place between arms producing countries especially in Europe – though coun-
tries protect their domestic production with juste retour. Regarding the collabo-
rative equipment procurement benchmark, however, the efforts have not been 
realized up to the stated targets as the share of European collaborative equip-
ment procurement between 2005 and 2014 was on average 17 % (EDA, 
2107).  
In the current article, cooperative purchasing is used to refer to two or more 
countries purchasing existing defense equipment, i.e. military off-the-shelf 
equipment, in contrast to collaborative purchasing where countries jointly de-
velop and manufacture the equipment that they purchase. As there is no 
product development, purchasing cooperation holds fewer risks and has a 
smaller economical minimum unit size, thereby making such cooperation 
more feasible between smaller nations than collaborative development. In ad-
dition to the potential economic gains in purchasing, such as increased negoti-
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ation power and sharing of evaluation costs and information, common 
equipment may facilitate other cooperation benefits in maintenance and in 
operation phases, such as in training and in maintenance. In an estimation of 
the potential for cooperative purchasing between the Nordic countries, the 
same obstacles of matching time-scales14 as well as similar enough require-
ments due to independent, national defense planning processes and differ-
ences in military tasks were found. Decisions on how to co-operate and with 
whom should be rooted in a rigorous cost and benefit analysis, along with a 
thorough public discussion of their industrial and political impact [31]. How-
ever, these impacts are not easily quantifiable even if all the relevant data were 
unclassified. 
Cooperative purchasing 
 
Cooperative actions been extensively studied both in private and public sec-
tors but articles dealing especially with cooperation in purchasing are still quite 
rare [28]. Cooperative purchasing is defined as the cooperation between two 
or more organizations in a purchasing group in one or more steps of the pur-
chasing process by sharing and/or bundling their purchasing volumes, infor-
mation, and/or resources. Through co-operative agreements, firms can take 
advantage of economies of scale in one or more of their production processes 
while remaining separate entities and cooperation benefits such professional-
ism and information sharing can be viewed as resulting from scale economies. 
A number of factors that facilitate more intense purchasing cooperation in-
cluding a small number of participants, geographical proximity, and similarity 
in purchasing requirements [4]. Similarity in size also helps because when one 
big organization dominates, other participants tend to simply use its contracts. 
It is suggested that success factors for cooperative purchasing groups that in-
clude no enforced participation; all members contributing with knowledge and 
the fair allocation of savings. The organizational form of purchasing coopera-
tion may be determined by the degree of influence held by all members and 
the number of different purchasing activities involved. In case of a low num-
ber of activities they identify a project group organization when all members 
have influence and a piggy-backing group when a large purchaser lets the 
smaller one(s) without much influence use its prices and contract. The type of 
defense equipment purchasing cooperation in this article involves a low num-
ber of activities because a high number of activities would have a more inten-
sive form and political implications.  
 
In recent years, there have been a few cooperative defense procurement initia-
tives in Europe. Table 1 (to be found in the paper below) contains a summary 
of such initiatives as well as their current status based on articles in Jane’s De-
                                                 
14 Defense equipment has long life cycle and renewal times and do not easily fall into same 
time-window. As an example of the timescales for decisions on fighter aircraft in the Nor-
dic countries: Sweden has a fleet of JAS Gripens, Norway selected the F-35 in 2008, Den-
mark in 2016, while Finland plans to select an F-18 replacement in 2021. 
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fense Weekly. However, an overall picture emerges with just a few (11) coop-
erative purchasing initiatives regarding major defense equipment. Out of those 
initiatives, three involving the Czech Republic were cancelled while the other 
eight are either completed or at least not cancelled. Some initiatives have 
complicated histories with multiple twists and turns, such as the Nordic heli-
copter purchase with Denmark quitting the consortium, and the tanker air-
craft where most of the initial initiative countries have pulled out, but now 
Germany intends to join again with an expected purchase decision by 2019 
and the Rheinmetall MAN trucks initiative where reported issues included 
delays after Norway pulled out of the collaborative Archer project with Swe-
den as well as legal concerns with the deal. The Smart Bombs provided by the 
U.S.A. were enabled by a recent change in the American legal interpretation 
that until now excluded Foreign Military Sales to a consortium.  
 
In terms of consortia, there are three large, multilateral projects involving 
NATO and EDA countries of which the Global Hawk is a Smart Defense 
initiative (Alliance Ground Surveillance) and the A330 Air Tanker is an EDA 
Pooling and Sharing initiative (Air-to-Air Refueling). The remaining initiatives 
in Table 1 include mostly just two, or in two cases, four small countries that 
are either Nordic or Visegard countries working together.  
It would be natural to assume that given the small defense budgets of, say the 
Baltic states, cooperative procurements would be regularly adopted between 
these countries. Similarly, it would be expected that cooperative procurements 
would be typical among the Nordic countries. As Table 1 shows, this is not 
the case, and in fact the situation is quite to the contrary.  
 
Research tasks 
 
When it comes to considering the collaborative acquisition of materiel, i.e. 
collaborative R&D and production, the share of collaboration in the overall 
investment may be low because many countries want to protect their domestic 
industries and producers of the defense materials. There are also problems in 
the commitment to joint efforts within, say, NATO. That there are so few 
cooperative purchases of materiel is harder to explain. It has been noticed that 
in a large number of cases, the advantage of cooperative purchasing outweigh 
the costs of cooperation and other disadvantages such as anti-trust (legal) is-
sues and disclosure of sensitive information. However, small and intensive 
purchasing groups do not flourish and such groups often prematurely end 
their cooperation. The economic benefits of a cooperative procurement as a 
joint venture arise from increased bargaining power relative to the contractor, 
and from reduced costs arising from economies of scale in production. They 
can be expected to provide economic incentives to participate in a procure-
ment alliance. There are potentially other benefits like in collaboration, whose 
objectives may be grouped into three main categories: economic, operational 
and political ones. 
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There is thus a puzzle. Why are cooperative procurements of defense materiel 
so rare? The current paper therefore asks three questions:  
 
? Under what conditions do the incentives for creating procurement joint 
ventures arise? 
? Why do the cooperative procurement efforts so seldom take place?  
? When are cooperative procurement coalitions stable?  
 
To address these issues, the paper introduces a bargaining model with for-
ward-looking expectations concerning the scale of delivery contracts. The 
previous analytic literature on collective procurement is rather limited and no 
such a theory has been suggested in terms of an analytic approach. To develop 
such a theory, one has to introduce the trade-off between the cost savings and 
the impact of the procurement on national security in a case where the option 
of cooperative procurement is available but where the countries are heteroge-
neous with regard to their preferences.15  
 
In the development of the analytic model of the current paper, the following 
mechanisms are introduced. The defense structures in organizing national de-
fense are typically nation-specific. Such a heterogeneity may result from the 
need for differentiated products and may require side payments (“bribes”) 
between the members in the joint venture to make it sustainable. This appears 
a harsh requirement. The potential opportunism in collective procurement 
may be controlled and commitment sustained if the interaction between the 
coalition and the producer is repeated and if the partners adopt appropriate 
punishment strategies for sustaining the partnership, such as abstaining from 
future commitments in a credible manner. The Folk Theorem suggest then 
that the set of feasible potential contracts is rather large but that some pun-
ishment strategies are needed to secure the survival of the partnership. Such a 
punishment may include the exclusion of the deviating partner member from 
the economic benefits from the subsequent cooperative procurements. 
 
There is a further subtle issue. At the negotiation table, the participants appar-
ently understand that the unit price to be settled will have an impact on the 
scale of the acquisition. The paper plans to address this issue. It will show that 
                                                 
15 It has been reported that in the case of NH90 helicopters, Finland was searching for a 
transportation helicopter, Denmark for a rescue helicopter, Norway for a helicopter for 
catching submarines, and Sweden wanted a helicopter with all these properties conditional 
that the helicopter would have Saab systems [19]. As an amusing anecdote was the sugges-
tion by one of the countries that the helicopter should have an option for toilets while an-
other country demanded that the option should include a toilet both for male and female 
soldiers [20]. The final offer by the producer included the option for a toilet but was so 
expensive that the toilet option was disregarded on short notice. There was more to it. Of 
the 18 NH90 TTH helicopters ordered by Sweden, 13 were of high cabin versions facilitat-
ing surgery operations to be carried out by taller male doctors. 
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the price sensitivity of the scale of acquisition is favorable for the buying part-
nership as it tends to depress the bargaining price. 
 
Results 
Several explanations are proposed as to why it is, however, hard to align the 
incentives of the buyers. First, the preferences concerning the properties of 
the products are country-specific with divergent implications for national se-
curity. Second, a country with a low valuation of the product has more bar-
gaining power than a country with a high valuation and may expect a side 
payment from the partner of the procurement, while the latter may not have 
sufficient incentives to pay. Third, the gains from cooperative procurement in 
terms of economies of scale for the producer may, after all, not be sufficient 
to compensate for the conflicting preferences. Fourth, while the future un-
predictability of technologies or the future risks of deteriorating national secu-
rity might support longer-term joint procurements, short-term opportunism 
tends to prevent long-term commitments. The paper shows, however, that 
long-term commitment may be even more difficult to achieve not least be-
cause of the uncertainties attached to the future development of the defense 
needs in strengthening national security and the unpredictability of the ad-
vancement of new defense technologies 
2.6. Cyber Technology and Arms Race  
 
HECER discussion paper N:o 424, February 2018. 
 
Background 
 
In June and July of 2010, the world learned about Stuxnet, a malicious com-
puter worm believed to be jointly created by American and Israeli cyber 
weapon specialists. Experts have been convinced that Stuxnet was meant to 
sabotage the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz in Iran and its centrifuge 
operational capacity, but the damage spread to other units, too. It is believed 
that most of the infected computers worldwide by Stuxnet have been in Iran. 
Judging from such a cyber operation, Israel apparently preferred to mount a 
cyber attack rather than a military strike on the nuclear facilities of Iran. There 
is little downside to such an attack because it would be virtually impossible to 
prove who did it. Though the attack against Iran was a success, the same is 
not true of the corresponding attempts to cause damage to the nuclear pro-
gram of North Korea. It is conceivable that such strikes have been planned 
and even attempted. With computerised instruments like Stuxnet, the world 
has entered into a new age, the era of cyber war. 
                                                                                           
 
27 
Cyber technology represents digital military capability with the purpose of 
causing damage to the military strength of a potential enemy. War using con-
ventional weapons may be preceded by or combined with a strike using cyber 
technology. Cyber issues are rapidly growing in importance to defence allianc-
es. At the Wales Summit in 2014, allied heads of state and government af-
firmed that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. 
Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging 
security challenges, gave a statement about NATO’s efforts to improve its 
cyber defences against emerging threats. The message is that by treating cy-
berspace as an operational domain, NATO aims to better protect its missions 
and operations. It will assist in the management of resources, skills, and capa-
bilities, and will also ensure that cyber defence is better reflected in military 
planning, exercises, training, and how NATO responds to crises. One of the 
questions is whether Article 5 would be triggered in the case of a cyber attack 
on a member country. Until recently, the political impact of cyberspace was 
thought to be a matter of low politics—background conditions and routine 
processes and decisions. Now, however, experts have begun to recognise its 
effect on high politics—national security, core institutions, and critical deci-
sion processes.  
The digital world has changed warfare not only in terms of the destructive 
power of the weapons and direct damage to the efficient use of the technolo-
gy-dependent weapons of the opponent but also indirectly causing paralysing 
effects on the society at large. By its logic, a cyber attack represents a pre-
emptive offensive, typically a remote action employing digital technologies to 
damage the social and/or military capabilities of an enemy. As cyber capability 
represents an instrument prior to a war with conventional weapons, modern 
warfare may consequently be viewed as a multi-stage game. A war with con-
ventional weapons tends to be preceded by a cyber war. A static one-stage 
approach, therefore, does not appear appropriate. The potential of cyber ca-
pability appears unlimited. The following mechanisms may be relevant: (i) 
both the cyber and the conventional military capabilities of the defender can 
be disturbed if its cyber capability suffers from the attack, (ii) a cyber attack 
need not result in civilian casualties, and (iii) the attacking country cannot easi-
ly be identified by the target country. Therefore, it is not trivial to initiate a 
counterattack. For these reasons, the threshold for a cyber attack may be low. 
A good question then is: how strong is the incentive to exploit the first-mover 
advantage from innovative success? 
 
Though our cyber war approach has a similar flavour with the economic liter-
ature on sabotage, there are differences. While the sabotage papers consider 
one-time decisions, our approach leads to sequential decision-making with a 
first-mover advantage in terms of a pre-emptive strike. The model allows for 
asymmetries between the hostile countries to produce cyber capabilities. The 
probability of winning a war is strictly convex in its size. This is the remarka-
ble property of the model. Moreover, while the papers on sabotage state that 
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expectations of being sabotaged have a discouraging effect (causing the partic-
ipants to reduce their effort), this is not the case in the current model.  
 
Research questions 
 
Access to a cyber attack raises a number of new questions:  
 
? How worthwhile is it to invest in conventional weapons if countries 
can resort to cyber instruments?  
? Does the answer depend on the differences in cyber capability?  
? What are the implications for the arms race and the probability of war-
fare?  
? Is it always the case that a cyber war is followed by a war with conven-
tional weapons? 
? Does the threshold to a cyber war differ from that of a conventional 
war?  
? How much is it optimal to invest in the cyber capability if the expected 
success differs between the conflicting parties? 
 
These are the issues to be analysed in the current paper and some of the an-
swers turn out to be unexpected. The roadmap of the model world of the pa-
per is as follows. The cost of war is first introduced in the standard model of 
contests. Then, an investment in cyber technology is introduced into this 
model in terms of the probability of being victorious in warfare. The invest-
ment in cyber capability is considered risky in terms of the outcome of the 
development effort. The outcome is private information for each country. 
The country that turns out to be more successful finds that it has the option 
of initiating a cyber attack against the enemy, but without knowing whether 
the enemy has been successful in its rival development effort, too. After the 
cyber war stage, the countries enter warfare with conventional weapons. It is a 
fundamental notion in the model world of this paper that the war cannot be 
won by a cyber attack only: conventional weapons are needed to capture the 
prize.  
 
Results 
 
The results of the paper can be summarised as follows. The cost of war turns 
out to be crucial for the results in that the equilibrium analysis in the war game 
is conditional on the cost of war relative to the payoff to being victorious. 
First, in the war game two types of Nash equilibria subject to warfare are pos-
sible depending on the cost of war relative to the payoff from victory. Both 
are subject of warfare. Under “small” cost of war, armament in conventional 
weapons is large; under “large” cost of war, armament is smaller. Second, if 
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countries expect to have access to equally effective cyber capabilities, their 
cyber investments are neutral in respect to the optimal investment in conven-
tional weapons but only when the cost of war is small. Such a symmetric case 
is not necessarily typical if countries have access to different technological 
skills and competence to start with. The third result is therefore concerned 
with an asymmetric case. It is shown that hostile countries choose to invest an 
equal amount of resources in their militaries, even when their cyber capabili-
ties differ, but under low perceived cost of war, they invest less than in the 
absence of cyber war technology. Surprisingly, they invest more when the per-
ceived cost of war is bigger. Moreover, the fourth result is rather dramatic in 
showing that cyber technologies can make the world unsafe. The intuitive reason is 
that technological advances in cyber capability lower the cost of war in con-
ventional weapons. The fifth result adds to the concerns of the cyber war giv-
en that cyber technologies are difficult and costly. Namely, heterogeneity in 
the success of cyber programs creates the option of a pre-emptive strike. The 
paper shows that a low success probability of the cyber program encourages 
exercising the cyber attack option by a successful country to be followed by 
warfare with conventional weapons. A successful cyber program means a new 
set of beliefs of the winning probability in the conventional war. The odds 
have been changed in favour of the attacking country. 
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